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1. Introduction 
The serious allegations made by Farlow as to the integrity of this study cannot be 
allowed to go by without comment. The study and general criticisms which relate to the 
sample, choice of variables and the findings are briefly dealt with. The main comments 
in this reply are directed at the 3 more specific issues which appear to be the real ~concern 
of the Federation, namely, worker participation, trade union input and interpretation of 
the aims of the Code of Practice for health and representatives and health and safety 
committees (1987). 
2. The study 
This research project, carried out in 1988, was based on a well documented and well 
respected study carried out in the United Kingdom by Beaumont and Leopold (1982). 
This study found that larger firn1s in high risk industries, covered by larger trade unions, 
were more likely to voluntarily set up manag~ement structures and health and safety 
programmes to deal with risk. These ffequently included participative structures in the 
form of worker fepresentative and joint worker .management committees. Such fnnas 
were also found to be quick to respond ·to legislative refonn. 
The sample 
The sampling method was appropriate for the hypothesis for the study (Mullen, 
1990, p .131) and the size of the sample was adequate according to standard empirical 
design. The response rate was much hi.gher (at 66 percent) than can noa1nally be expected 
in population surveys of this type. 'The respondents were shown to be representative of 
the population (Mullen, 1990, p.l32-3). 
The fact that the sample was selected on a different basis from that of the Department 
of Labour was acknowledged (Mullen 1990, p.140).. However, it was possible to 
demonstrate that for those fiuns who acknowledged receipt of a Code of Practice the 
findings with regard to adoption rates and numbers of firms with health and safety 
committees and repr~esentatives were very similar to those found by the Department of 
Labour. 
Choice of variab.Ies 
The variables from the work of Beaumont and Leopold (1982) provided the 
framework for this study. Variables were also selected from elements of the work carried 
• Deparunent of Managemen·t, University of Otago . 
I 
190 Elizabeth A. Mullen 
out by a range of other researchers, theorists and experts in the field, these including 
(amongst others), Campbell (1987), Kjellstrom (1983), Mcintosh and Gurdon (1986) and 
Walters (1987). The study was designed to identify whether funts in New Zealand 
responded to risk, proposals for legislative change and bade union influence in a similar 
way to fnans in other countries. 
The adoption of a Code of Practice, and therefore structures for worker participation, 
was included as one of the variables relating to "good" health and safety practices. The 
main hypothesis was that larg~er firms who had a wide range of practices such as a senior 
member of staff responsible for health and safety, policies and procedures for dealing with 
risk, training which included health and safety and negotiated clauses in awards and 
agr~eements, would show a greater propensity to adopt a Code of Practice and initiate 
participative structures. These practices might be moderated by industry risk, the level of 
inspection and the activities of trade unions. 
Findin ,gs 
The size of the firm was, as expected, a major indicator for the presence of a wider 
range of health and safety practices. However, the finding that the presence and range of 
practices was not related to industry risk, the level of inspection nor the existence of 
negotiated clauses in awards and agreements was both unexpected, and of concern. 
No clear relationship was found in this study between the size of the main trade 
union representing the workforce and the size of the fnnt, nor with the presence and range 
of structures and practices to deal with risk. Trade unions were, however, able to 
encourage a proportion of frr1us to adopt a code of practice although they had little or no 
opportunity for direct participation in the fuan and little general influence apart from the 
negotiation of clauses into awards and agreements. Clauses in awards and agreements had 
little effect on organizational practices. 
'There are a number of factors which may have precluded a more significant or direct 
role for trade unions. These include our "unique" highly centralized system of industrial 
relations, the economic climate of the late 1980s and the detet1nination of New Zealand 
employers to keep trade unions out of the workplace (Business Roundtable, 1989 and 
1990). 
3. Specific issues 
This last paragraph brings us closer to what appear to be the specific issues the 
Federation wishes to address. The first 2 relate to the possibility of a mandatory 
requirement for the participation of workers in the management of workplace health and 
safety a specific role for trade unions in any new legislation. The third area is over the 
interpretation of the aims of the Advisory Committee on Occupational Safety and Health 
(ACOSH) when introducing the Code of Practice, and whether this was envisaged as a 
precursor for legislative reform. These issues are dealt with in tum. 
Worker participation in health and safety 
No reference was made at any point in the report on this study to the replacement of 
existing regulations and codes of practice for health and safety by worker participation, 
this would clearly be absurd. Worker participation can only be seen as an additional, and 
by the evidence from other countries, an essential mechanism to specific regulations in 
the management of occupational health and safety if an improvement in the rate of injury 
and ill health is to be achieved. 
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The existence and level of participative schemes for health and safety in New Zealand 
firms both prior to an in response to the Code of Practice was acknowledged. The 
frequencies for employee representatives and ~committees were set out in table 5 (Mullen, 
1990, p.136). This clearly showed that a fair proportion of those fuans employing 50 or 
more people had r~epresentatives and committees. Indeed, in those finns employing 100 
or more people 44 percent had representatives and 55.4 pe~cent had committees. It should 
be noted, however, that firms of this size fo.nn only a tiny proportion of the frrms in 
New Zealand. And again, the presence of participative structures was related to size and 
not to risk. 
The Federation insists that participation may be counterproductive to "good" health 
and safety practices by giving authority and responsibility to non-management personnel 
without corr~esponding accountability. If this is so, one must speculate as to why a 
significant pfoportion of our largest firms do in fact initiate such pliogrammes. There 
was no evidence in the study that this was as a result of pressure from trade unions, but a 
spontaneous effort on the part of employers to adopt participation as one of a range of 
"gcxxf' practices. 
The influence of trade unions 
The finding from :the study was 'that trade unions in New Zealand were not accorded a 
direct role in the management of workplace health and safety. 'This should not be taken 
as an indication that trade unions are therefore unnecessary. Evidence from past research, 
and particularly a recently published study from the United States (Weil, 1991), suggests 
that implem~entation of occupational health and safety regulations is :more likely to be 
effective (i.e. lead to a reduction in injury and ill health) in unionized establishments. 
Unionized workers are ,mor~e likely to be well info1 naed about workplace risk, and the 
combination of employee participation in Lhe management of occupational health and 
safety and complementary union health and safety structures encourages worse perfo1naing 
employers to improve their practices and ensures more accurate inspection and 
enforcement 
The fear that workers and unions might ,misuse their power and target particular 
employers and/or use health and safety to force the employer's hand on other unrelated 
issues which were under dispute, has not been borne out Smith (1986, p.47), again in 
the United States, found that complaints were not linked with collective bargaining 
disputes and ther~e was strong evidence that oo1nplaints correlated 'Wilh serious violations 
and not at all with trivial ones. 
The purpose of 'the Code of Practice 
The foreword of the Code of Practice (1987, p.l) stated that ACOSH, of which the 
Employers' Federation was a member, was of the fit1n view that occupational health and 
safety could best be promoted by a system which facilitated the joint participation of 
workers and management in promoting and maintaining working conditi.ons and work 
practices. This view is in keeping with those of many other ~escarchers in this area (there 
are a few exceptions, see Brook, 1 '990, p.l45-14 7). It is also in keeping with lhe 
findings of r~evicws of health and safety legislation in other countries and the subsequent 
nature of ne·w legislation in countries such as the United Kingdom, the United States, 
Canada and Australia and most European Community countries. 
The notion 'that there wer~e no plans to embody the provisions of the Code in new 
legislation does not stand up to scrutiny. It was clear that based on ACOSH's review of 
the ~extent of adoption of the provisions of the voluntary Code of Practice further action 
would be considered (Department of Labour, 1987, p.l). This was later evidenced by the 
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Public Discussion Paper for ·Occupational Safety and Health Refo1111 issued in June 1988 
and the Occupational Safety and Health Bill introduced in 1990. 
4. Conclusion 
The Employers' Federation has little to fear. 'The research study discussed here, along 
with the vast body of research done by others in this area, will almost certainly have little 
or no influence on the decisions of the select committee when it meets to review the 
Occupational Health and Safety Bill later this year. There is no explicit role for ttade 
unions under the provisions of the Occupational Safety and Health Bill (1990). The 
likelihood of health and safety representatives and committees remaining a mandatory 
element is remote. The mechanisms for enforcing this section appear weak and will 
almost certainly disappear in the interests of "freedom of choice for the individual" 
enshrined in the Employment Contracts Act 1991. 
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